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          ___________________________________________________________________ 
  
 Managing Loan ‘Delinquency’ and Microfinance: Lessons from Zambia 
 
         ___________________________________________________________________ 
 
ABSTRACT 
                                              
The paper seeks to correct the neglected importance of loan officers in microfinance by 
explaining their roles, dilemmas and tensions when actually working with clients. Few 
existing studies have used data outside Bangladesh and many focus upon well-performing 
institutions. This study draws its data from Zambia and focuses on the recent repayment 
crisis of CETZAM and the effects of strategies for dealing with defaulters. Our findings 
firstly show that loan officers faced powerful hierarchical accountability pressures and under 
intense pressure, used inappropriate methods to compel repayments. Second, because of their 
problematic relationships with clients, loan officers experienced job-related tensions through 
performing conflicting roles that called for a particular management of emotions. Third, the 
approach to borrower default is shown to be so detrimental for CETZAM’s short and long-
term survival that it could call other developments into question. 
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         INTRODUCTION 
 
“Microfinance has proved its value, in many countries, as a weapon against poverty and hunger. It 
really can change peoples’ lives for the better –especially the lives of those who need it most” 
(Kofi Annan, UN Secretary General, 18 November 2004). 
 
 
2005 had been declared the ‘International Year of Microcredit’ by the United Nations. 
This declaration was a demonstration of support from the world community of the 
importance of microcredit for overall economic development. Governments, NGOs, the 
private sector and the media had been invited by the UN to highlight the role of 
microcredit and microfinance in poverty reduction. The target of reaching 100 million 
impoverished people (especially women) with credit by 2005 (Microcredit Summit, 
1997) had once again attracted world-wide attention for the tool of microfinance. As a 
build up, therefore, to the year of microcredit, evaluation of microfinance programs had 
attracted much attention as an increasingly important aspect of development activity.  
Agencies, and particularly aid donors, have all sought to ensure that funds are well 
spent (Eversole, 2003; Hulme, 2000), and thereby prove that microcredit activities 
reduce poverty (Gulli and Berger, 1999).  
 
Consequently, accountability and justification are distinctive features of microfinance 
today. Despite demonstrated successes in reaching some of the poor in providing credit 
(Hulme and Mosley, 1996; Morduch, 2000), the poorest remain beyond many 
microfinance institutions’ reach (Ahmad, 2000; Ito, 1999) and this has required 
particular –often economic- explanation.1 Such evaluation research therefore reflects an  
‘economic bias’ in its impact assessment of microcredit on poverty (Copestake, et al., 
2000, 2002; Hulme and Mosley, 1996, 1998); outreach to the poor (Gjerding, 2002; 
                                                 
1 Economic models from an institutional perspective have used transaction costs and show that these are too 
high for the poor (Bhatt and Tang, 1998; North, 1990), sociologists have looked at social capital and the role of 
networks Coleman, 1990; Portes, 1998; Woolcock, 1998, 2001), while anthropologists have pointed to cultural 
factors (Mayoux, 1999, 2001). 
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Hulme, 2000; Navajas et al., 2000); and empowerment of women (Goetz, 2001; 
Kabeer, 2001; Mayoux, 2001; Rahman, 1999a). 
 
 
Replications of lending methodologies and issues such as, client/borrower exit from 
credit programs have been studied with a view to improve service delivery (Hulme and 
Mosley, 1996; Hulme, 2000; Pal, 1999; Wilson, 2001). In short, evaluations of 
microfinance programs have hitherto been dominated by a concern with impact 
assessment, program replication, client outreach and financial sustainability. 
 
While relevant to understanding microfinance, and also attractive to donors, such 
research nevertheless neglects the processes of microfinance at work and puts more 
emphasis upon its original strategy than subsequent implementation. Research 
particularly neglects field workers or loan officers (Ahmad, 2000; Goetz, 2001, 1997) 
and their interface with poor people (Holcombe, 1995; Jackson, 1997). A number of 
issues and problems concerned with the work loan officers actually do at the most 
critical interface have arguably not been sufficiently addressed before, which are 
potentially critical for frontier territory like Zambia, where microfinance still needs to 
progress from simply promising beginnings. Loan officers are the major link between 
microfinance institutions (MFIs) and their poor clients and are central for service 
delivery (Ahmad, 2002; Goetz, 2001). Because they mediate transactions between 
MFIs and borrowers, loan officers are thought to implement policies of MFIs in ways 
that imply in-depth understanding of clients and empathy for successful lending 
(Ahmad, 2002; Chua, 1998; Goetz, 2001; Holcombe, 1995; Jain and Moore, 2003; 
Pawlak, 2002). In short, it is argued that “the heart of MFI lies with its fieldworkers” 
(Chua, 1998), yet that argument has not really been fully examined. 
 
Loan officers face tensions and challenges because of conflicting expectations between 
clients and MFIs, accentuated by inability to enforce joint liability and social sanctions 
in group based lending methodologies (Jain, 1996; MKNelly and Kevane, 2002; Matin, 
2000; Vogeldesang, 2003). The dilemmas between fulfilling their client ‘nurturing’ 
roles which call for the use of time and social skills as opposed to the other tasks 
assigned by their home MFIs are not necessarily easily resolved. So far there has been 
little research into how loan officers adapt to these situations and what effects these 
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adaptations then have. There are particular questions about how each actor within the 
lending process uses the existing relations to further their interests in a given context. 
For example, how do these interactions between clients, loan officers and their 
management shape MFI performance? Such questions are important because the 
actions of loan officers have substantial and sometimes unexpected and unintended 
consequences for the actual direction and outcome of many credit programs. The 
following sections therefore review the literature on loan officers’ work within 
microfinance, describe the context to the study, the MFI selected and the research 
methods used, and resulting research findings. The study concludes by considering why 
the implementation of group based lending programs can prove so unexpectedly 
problematic especially where the lending process so depends upon appropriate social 
relationships and becomes flawed when these are not suitably developed. 
 
Fieldworkers: A Brief Review 
Among the few empirical studies of loan officers/field workers are those of Ahmad 
(2000) and Goetz (2001) based on the MFIs in Bangladesh moving from a pioneering 
to developing stage where high repayment rates are considered a notably ‘heroic' 
outcome of their continuing progress. Goetz (2001) for example, explores the question 
of institutional change from the point of view of women fieldworkers and their role in 
promoting gender equality within a microcredit program among poor women. These 
field workers were critical to communicating policy changes to borrowers and 
responsible for effecting the ‘fit’ between top-level policy ‘initiatives’ and local 
‘realities’. They operated under particular pressure to secure high rates of repayment as 
their institutions sought financial sustainability, and were assessed primarily on the 
basis of their credit-delivery performance. Findings in other countries have been similar 
(Ito, 2003; Rahman, 1999b; Reinke, 1998; Schreiner, 1999). Goetz concluded that the 
importance and influence of field workers was in principle reflected in whether and 
how they reconciled their organisations’ goals with their own personal preferences. Ito 
(2003) observed that field workers with diverse roles faced the rival demands between 
increasing loan disbursement and repayment as compared with borrowers’ requirements 
to be sensitive to their own specific circumstances and requirements.  
 
Ahmad (2000, 2002) also argued that the microfinance literature has evaluated the 
activities of Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) without sufficient reference to 
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the views of those who actually work with clients. Like Goetz (2001) Ahmad (2000) 
also found field workers to be implementers of policies but were nevertheless 
organisationally dis-empowered. ‘Very little research has been conducted on the field 
workers in both the North and South and yet, it’s the strength of field workers, which 
ensures the smooth functioning of the MFIs’ (Ahmad, 2000: 64). Both Ahmad and 
Goetz (op cit) argued that the practices and perspectives of field workers themselves 
were under researched. Outside South Asia, little knowledge exists about their actual 
roles within the group lending programs. Understanding of the loan officers’ roles 
within the credit lending process in Southern Africa is particularly limited to findings 
based on MFIs in South Asia and also from general studies on impact assessment of 
microcredit programmes, client exit surveys, outreach of MFIs and group dynamics. 
 
The focus of this study is on loan officers in MFIs in Zambia and how they adapt to the 
respective demands of MFIs and their clients, as illustrated by how one emerging MFI-
CETZAM- managed its own repayment crisis. It finds that loan officers pressured to 
account for their activities and recover money pursued strategies that called for them to 
‘manage emotions’ in such a way as to increase the sense of shame among defaulters, 
thereby weakening their groups’ mutual guarantee even further. The strategies pursued 
by CETZAM in dealing with widespread ‘delinquency’ (a term actually used by the 
institution themselves when referring to those defaulting on mutually assured loans) are 
found to be of a short term in nature and potentially detrimental to outreach and 
sustainability. Such an approach, coupled with a poor national credit culture, weak 
governance rules, mistrust and competition from other MFIs ultimately weakened 
CETZAM’s trust bank methodology. ‘Delinquency’ turns not only on the lending 
policies and costs of the program but also on the nature and extent of social relations (a) 
among clients in groups, (b) between clients and loan officers and (c) between loan 
officers and management. This is significant given the ‘benchmarks’ now used 
regarding microfinance performance and a bias towards reporting ‘excellent’ loan 
repayment rates of 98 per cent and above among ‘successful’ mature MFIs elsewhere. 
Such benchmarks may conceal the underlying problems of MFIs in early stages of 
development unless these further issues are recognised and resolved. 
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The Zambian Context and the CETZAM’s Case 
 Microfinance in Zambia is relatively young and has operated without a distinct legal 
and regulatory framework until recently (Dixon, et al., forthcoming).2 The sector 
emerged in the 1990s (Maimbo and Mavrotas, 2003; Musona, 2004) and is largely 
donor driven, with an urban concentration. By September 1999, there were nearly thirty 
organisations engaged in MFI activities (Maimbo and Mavrotas, 2003). Currently, it is 
estimated that there are twenty established MFIs (AMIZ membership list, 2003)3, most 
of which are either inactive or quite localised and small compared to other MFIs in 
South Asia and East Africa. Despite their numbers outreach remains low in relation to 
the potential ‘market’, and the scope of services is likewise limited, mostly to 
microcredit with little savings mobilisation. Like MFIs in Kenya (Johnson et al., 2003), 
Zambian MFIs face relatively high levels of delinquency and default, high operating 
costs, slow intake and high client exits which constrain their efforts to achieve the 
financial and organisational sustainability now considered so important. Indeed, most 
are now faced with challenges of ‘good governance’ (given their NGO status) and often 
struggle to maintain high repayment rates.  
 
CETZAM is funded by the British Department for International Development (DFID) 
and is one of Zambia’s best known microfinance institutions.  Its headquarters are in 
Kitwe (Copperbelt province) and was founded in 1995 as an NGO driven by Christian 
principles to ‘transform the lives of the poor’ by ‘providing opportunities to create 
employment and generate income through credit and training services’ (Field notes, 
2004). Its first loans were disbursed in July 1998, and DFID agreed to provide £2.29 
million in financial support for a five-year period starting February 1998 (Copestake, 
2002). CETZAM expects its clients will become agents of transformation4 within their 
communities (CETZAM CEO, Nov. 2003) where ‘transformation’, may be economic, 
social, spiritual or political in scope. CETZAM therefore originally anticipated its loan 
                                                 
2 The Bank of Zambia has finalised the regulatory framework that would allow some MFIs to mobilise savings, 
but more importantly, establish governance rules (that have been non-existent hitherto) and formal 
accountability channels with the central bank.  
3 AMIZ stands for the Association of Microfinance Institutions of Zambia. Most of the MFIs are affiliated to 
AMIZ, including CETZAM.  
4 Opportunity International Network defines ‘transformation’ as a ‘deeply rooted positive change in beliefs, 
values, attitudes, actions, relationships and structures manifested in a higher level of existence of an individual 
and/or community’ (Cheston, S. et al., 2000). 
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officers as having a transformational role with poor clients, but this research will 
question how transforming their relationship has been. 
 
CETZAM expressly uses a group-based poverty lending methodology specially 
intended to target the poorest of the economically active population-especially women 
(CETZAM brochure, 2001). To qualify for a loan, a borrower needs no physical 
collateral, but must belong to a joint-liability credit group, as is the practice with most 
group lending methodologies (Dixon, et al., forthcoming). A loan officer’s intended 
role is to assess the eligibility of potential clients, visit their businesses, and train them 
in CETZAM’s lending methodology -including some basic book keeping skills- for ten 
weeks before disbursing loans to them. Trust Banks are thus supposed to become 
tightly knit self-support groups with the ability to transform their lives and 
communities. Self-selection of group members is a major element of the methodology 
together with joint mutual guarantees (Bastelaer, 1999; Matin, 2000). In addition, group 
lending programs operate in a way that the work of screening, monitoring, and 
enforcement of repayment are to a large extent progressively transferred from the 
MFI’s agent (loan officer) to the group members themselves (Hermes, et al., 2005, 
Marr, 2002; Rhyne, 2001; Sharma and Zeller, 1997). Several observers have addressed 
the perceived advantages of such collective action in the actual screening of loan 
applicants and monitoring of borrowers (Bhatt and Tang, 2001; Besley and Coate, 
1995; MkNelly and Kevane, 2002; Morduch, 1999; Navajas, et al., 2003; Reinke, 1998; 
Rhyne, 2001; Stiglitz 1990; Varian, 1990). One main argument is that group members 
can obtain, at low cost, an understanding of the reputation and indebtedness of the loan 
applicant and their efforts to ensure repayment (Bastelaer, 1999) and thereby ‘socially 
obligate’, rather than formally compel, that repayment. 
The principle behind these groups is that they will be readily mobilized, cost effective, 
and boost repayment rates through an enforcement mechanism where group members 
can use social sanctions against their defaulting members, offer a screening function (to 
avoid forming groups with risky borrowers), and thus co-guarantee any loans. This 
joint-liability mechanism, it is argued, has been a major methodological breakthrough 
for lending to the poor (Ahmad, 2002; Bhatt and Tang, 2001; Goetz, 2001; Hulme and 
Mosley, 1996; Ito, 2003; Rahman, 1999a). However, there is mixed evidence on actual 
‘enforcement’ of joint liability, and several authors observe that, while issues of joint 
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liability are widely discussed in weekly meetings, it is not always ‘enforced’, making 
the intended shared responsibility difficult if not impossible to realize (Ito, 1999, 2003; 
Jain, 1996; Jain and Moore, 2003; MkNelly and Kevane, 2002; Pal, 1999; Rahman, 
1999a; Schreiner, 1999; Vogelgesang, 2003). 
 
          Research Methodology  
The study is based on a period of intensive qualitative research conducted in late 2003 
based on the researcher’s ‘indigenous knowledge’ of the local context and culture as 
well as extensive prior local field experience. It was not originally intended to be a 
study of CETZAM and its ‘delinquency’ crisis. Rather the researcher set out to explore 
the emerging role of loan officers in MFIs providing credit to the poor (especially 
women). CETZAM was originally selected for study as a successful model (Copestake, 
et al., 2002).5 The problem of ‘delinquency’ at CETZAM was therefore not known 
prior to the study but later emerged in an iterative way while field work continued. A 
combination of observations, semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions and 
informal discussions with loan officers, clients, immediate supervisors and senior 
management were used in the study. 
 
In all 20 formal interviews were conducted, tape recorded and subsequently transcribed, 
each lasting between forty-five minutes to one and half hours.6 A semi-structured 
interview approach was taken using broad open ended questions in order to encourage 
the interviewees’ own interpretations of everyday actions (Maykut and Morehouse, 
1994). This approach is intended to empower interviewees, enabling them to speak in 
their own “voices” (LIewellyn, 2001) and a degree of freedom to explain their thoughts 
and highlight any areas of particular interest. While the interview guide imposed some 
structure on each interview, the researcher ensured that it was the interviewees’ 
perspectives being gained and therefore the guide was not used in an overly 
                                                 
5 CETZAM has 5 branches on the copperbelt, 1 branch was picked (for detailed study) that had the highest 
number of loan officers (5), with range of 2-4 years of service. All the loan officers were interviewed and 
observed. This also meant interviewing the branch accountant and manager as well. This branch is typical of the 
other 4 branches.  
 
6 Most interviews with clients could not be tape recorded (6 out of 9) due to noises at their trading premises and 
were also not comfortable with the recording machine. Detailed notes were written up immediately after these 
interviews. 3 senior managers, 2 immediate supervisors (at branch level), 1 former loan officer, 3 clients and 6 
loan officers made up the 15 recorded interviews. 
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constraining manner (Patton, 1990). The one-to-one interviews with loan officers were 
supplemented with a semi-structured questionnaire which addressed the personal 
background of loan officers, reasons for seeking employment with the organisation, 
knowledge of their organisation’s client target, aims and services provided. Access to 
internal reports at branch level (though very limited) added meaning to the interview 
data with loan officers. 
Access to internal meetings was granted by the branch manager on condition that tapes 
and notes were not taken during the meetings. Twelve morning review meetings of loan 
officers and their immediate supervisor were observed in situ (Dixon, et al., 
forthcoming). This method was found to serve the purpose of exposing the meanings, 
perceptions and interactions from an insider’s perspective and gave context to the other 
data that could not be accessed through interviews alone. The researcher also 
accompanied loan officers in the field to capture the ‘oral’ character of microfinance 
and observe the process as it occurred. In order to capture a grassroots view of loan 
officers in the field, the researcher attended six trust bank group meetings to observe 
the interactions between loan officers and clients, and noted their reactions. Observed 
contradictions were followed up and clarifications obtained through informal interviews 
and conversations. Field notes were written up soon after meetings and at the end of 
each day. Focus group discussions with clients and loan officers were held (separately) 
to gain their perceptions about microfinance in practice (Bryman, 2001; Krueger, 1994) 
while other data was collected by observably ‘being around’ (Rahman and Goddard, 
1998, p. 187). 
 
By focusing on the actors’ own interpretation and subjectivity, this field study therefore 
sought to find how the actors involved in the lending process made sense of situations 
and everyday practices. Consequently, the style of research required for this purpose 
was a grounded theory approach to the process of microfinance of an interpretive 
character (Morgan and Smircich, 1980; Miles and Huberman, 1984 in Hoque, et al., 
2004, p.61; Silverman, 2000). The intention was to capture the ‘ambiguities, tensions 
and contradictions’ in the ‘messiness’ of a loan officers’ work and also specifically 
bring out the emotional and social character of microfinance in action. It also helped the 
researcher interpret how loan officers brought the MFI and their clients together. This 
link between documents, interviews, questionnaires and observations is referred to as 
the degree of correspondence (or lack thereof) between what people [loan officers] say- 
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their ‘espoused theory’-and what they actually did- ‘theory in action’ (Argyris and 
Schon, 1978 in Collier, 2001 p. 471). It is therefore this triangulation of data that 
provided a check for internal validity of the results of the study.  
             
The Founding Phase 
A synopsis of CETZAM’s first six years of operation- July 1998 to December 2003 
reveals its impressive start considering the near collapse that followed five years after 
those first loans. Even in its initial phase it faced pressures of expansion, then later had 
to deal with the problems of ‘delinquency’ in order to survive, an issue that dominated 
the period of this research. CETZAM was the first of the ‘new wave’ minimalist 
microcredit organisations and originally claimed great success (in terms of client 
outreach), then recording repayment rates of 98 per cent and over (Copestake, 2002; 
Copestake, et al., 2000), with low percentages of Portfolio at Risk7 (PAR), and 
Portfolio in Arrears. This founding ‘success story’ led to a massive client outreach 
drive (see fig. 1) that was partly driven by outside donors  as well as itself as together 
they envisaged conversion of CETZAM into a registered bank with a network of at 
least 20 branches serving 50,000 clients by 2005 (Cheston, et al., 2000). CETZAM 
expanded its outreach to about 9,390 active clients and five branches by year 2000,8 
and had by all standards exceeded all original grant targets (Copestake, et al., (2000). 
As Figure One shows, the numbers of borrowers started small, rose quickly, 
approaching 16,135 by 2002, but then fell dramatically to 5,382 by the end of 2003. 
Notwithstanding the success CETZAM achieved over those six years of its operation, it 
bore symptoms of crisis that its new chief executive officer (the third in 7 years) said: 
‘It is a pity you have come at such a time when the organisation is going through a very rough 
patch. CETZAM is being restructured and things are not good and work is hectic as we try to put 
the organisation back on its feet’. CETZAM has experienced declining client membership, low 
repayment rates and rising percentages of PAR (Interview with CEO-5/11/03).  
By the end of 2003, PAR thirty days and over stood at 30 per cent (the set target being 
5 per cent), while the percentage of portfolio in arrears at thirty days and over was 22 
                                                 
7 PAR is a measure of loan quality that considers not just missed repayments of delinquent clients, but the 
remaining outstanding balance of loans, which are at risk of not being repaid. The determination of when a loan 
is at risk is based on the age of the arrears and can vary among MFIs. A ‘cut-off’ of 30 days is usually the norm. 
8 For CETZAM, active clients are clients with loans appearing on the aging analysis, while inactive clients are 
those on recess, or on orientation, or waiting for a re-loan. Clients in arrears are those with delinquent loans but 
are within the loan cycle, which has not expired. Overdue clients are defined as clients with loans that are out of 
loan cycle but still owing money (CETZAM Memo- CET/482/SHZ/03. Dated: 6/5/03, accessed 21/11/03). 
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per cent (see Fig. 2). In part the high arrears rate may be associated with the rapid 
growth of the institution when screening, evaluation, and monitoring of loans may have 
been weakened by the relatively abundant availability of funds.9 From the clients’ 
perspective, the perception of CETZAM as an NGO [and] using external funds may 
have created an incentive to default.  Loan disbursement in the year 2003 fell to 
minimal levels due to PAR related problems.  
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 Figure 1 Number of borrowing clients from July.1998-Dec. 2003 
 Source: Dixon, et al., forthcoming. 
 
By the end of 2001, CETZAM had opened twelve branches (most not eventually 
sustainable), employed eighty-five loan officers who operated under the ‘pressures of 
expansion’, (Cheston, et al., 2000), and had a large number of clients. According to its 
loan officers, the received message from head office had been “disburse, disburse”. 
Average number of clients per loan officer stood at 375 against the expected standard 
load of 350. Meanwhile CETZAM had a significantly high-risk portfolio that consisted 
                                                 
9 Loans disbursed to fake client groups and ‘ghost’ clients created by loan officers also contributed to high 
arrears and eventually written off (Based on interviews with clients, management and loan officers-Nov 2003) 
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of overdue clients, ‘ghost clients’ and those in arrears (debtors), together reflecting 
significant sums of capital at risk (Fig.2).  
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 Fig.2 CETZAM’s Quarterly Portfolio at risk and in arrears over six years of operation. 
Source: CETZAM’s internal figures. 
 
With branches in twelve towns located in three broad provinces, CETZAM was widely 
spread and risked losing control. There was also a lack of timely and accurate 
information that made the program vulnerable to potential staff fraud (Field notes 
2003). By mid 2003, CETZAM decided to write off thousands of clients as ‘bad debts’ 
and loan officers became focused on ‘pressures of delinquency’. As a result, CETZAM 
reduced its branches from twelve to seven and loan officers from 85 to 28 (see table 
One) while this study was in progress.  
Ironically, its quarterly loan disbursements increased up to 2002 (see fig. 3) and 
thereafter declined as the organisation stood at the verge of its potential collapse10, 
amid widespread default and other rumours of unethical behaviour. Interestingly, the 
                                                 
10 2003 figures for amounts disbursed were not made available and proved difficult to access. The statement 
referring to decline in disbursement of loans is based on the interview with one of the managers at head office-
CETZAM, 26 November 2003.            
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outreach and financial performance indicators (as seen in Fig. 1 and 2) did not tie up 
with other activities. This supports Jain and Moore’s (2003) view that organisations so 
focussed upon collecting overdue payments are already in trouble.  
 
Table One: CETZAM’s TREND DATA (2000-2004) 
 
 Dec2000 Dec 2001 Dec 2002 Dec 2003 April 2004 Dec 2004 
No. of 
branches 
7 12 12 07 07 07 
No. of loan 
officers 
- 60 85 28 26 35 
Active 
clients 
9,390 13, 327 16,135 5,402 4,901 6,214 
Average  
client load 
per loan 
officer 
- 222 233 192 188 180 
 
Source: Compiled from CETZAM documents 
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Quarterly Disbursements: 1998-2002
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 Fig. 3. Quarterly amounts in loan disbursed over four years. 
          Source: CETZAM documents 
 
The further evidence-based discussion on ‘delinquency’ is based on one of CETZAM’s 
five branches on the Copperbelt. ‘Wesu’ (fictitious name) branch for instance had 2,024 
clients in January 2003, and an average of 350 clients per loan officer. By December 
2003, this fell to 825 clients (others being ‘written off’), and loan officers reduced to 
five from seven. Interviews with loan officers and branch manager and close 
observations in the field revealed there were different perspectives about the problems 
at hand (see box 1):  
   
   BOX 1 
 
 
 
 
 
Loan officers’ views 
The problem is not just with us loan officers. Management is to blame as well as they had put us under 
pressure to form groups. We were just fighting to have groups so that we reach targets within a short period 
of time. So we started compromising. People, oh, I mean loan officers just started getting anyone and not 
the economically active. So when money was given to them it was hallelujah!! They [clients] didn’t bother 
to pay. But the end result was disastrous and we paid dearly as most loans were just written off in the end. 
That is why even our donors wanted to withdraw (LO 1). 
 
At times we loan officers don’t visit clients’ businesses before the loan appraisals, but just sit in the office 
and the loans come out. So some clients may not even have businesses and defaulting becomes inevitable 
(LO 2). 
 
 The cornerstone of microcredit in CETZAM is the methodology and we have to follow it. But there are 
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The Loan Officer’s Position  
 
One internal document listed the loan officers’ key formal responsibilities as: 
Marketing CETZAM products and services to clients, explain CETZAM lending 
policies and procedures, facilitate group formation, train clients on CETZAM 
methodology, facilitate timely loan disbursements, monitor usage of loan funds and 
make follow ups with clients to ensure timely repayment, engage in delinquency 
management with clients who are failing to make repayments on time and also 
implement transformational activities aimed at empowering all clients.  
 
Formally loan officers then report directly to the branch manager and indirectly to the 
operations manager. In view of their many roles, one head office manager described 
loan officers as having a ‘transformational role’ where the organisation expects them to 
be ‘change agents’ as they interact with clients. That loan officers are key to the success 
of microfinance and have: 
A very difficult job to do in that they carry with them the financial services CETZAM provides to 
the client, the vision of the organisation and their personality.  All these factors are quite difficult 
to handle. In addition, there are expectations from the organisation and clients that we need to 
balance with (Interview-26/11/03, Kitwe). 
In a group discussion, loan officers alternatively themselves claimed that: 
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We are mediators, agents, front-liners and key players. Loan officers are seen as providers from 
the clients’ perspective and as deliverers of services on behalf of organisation.  So a loan officer is 
expected to meet the demands of the clients who expect loan officers to be understanding and 
quick with loan disbursement while the organisation expects targets to be met (FGD-21/11/03). 
 
The point loan officers are making here is that they link clients with the MFIs through 
daily interaction (Jackson, 1997; Reinke, 1998). As Schreiner (1999) states, 
‘microfinance rests on personal relationships, in particular, that between the loan officer 
and the borrower.’ However these ‘affective ties’ are constructed in the presence of 
divergent expectations and can be emotion laden. Evidence suggested that loan officer-
client interactions and relationships were complicated by conflicting expectations as 
well as the targets set (for example, zero arrears) that consequently impacted on all 
relations concerned with ‘delinquency’. One loan officer said: 
But management and donors do not understand the realities on the ground. Most of them up there 
[management] have not been in the field, never formed and managed a trust bank to have a feel of 
what it takes to mobilize people and ensure loans are repaid, while keeping clients loyal and 
motivated.  
           Another indicated:  
“Our job is about meeting targets and management does not want to hear any other story. But the 
problem is that these expectations keep pulling us in different directions”.  
Such disparate demands and tensions at the client-loan officer interface, loan officer 
and management within the broader demands of the MFI are captured in Figure 4. 
Fig. 4 Framing the tensions and conflicting demands within microfinance 
 
                                                                        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                       
                      
 
 
  MICROFINANCE 
   MANAGEMENT 
 
 
L/Os 
    
   DONORS 
Exerting pressure on MFIs to: 
- Achieve sustainability.        
-Demand internal accountability. 
-Maximise client outreach/volume 
-Use tested lending methodologies   
How has the 
loan officer 
adapted?   
Tensions: Balancing the 
requirements/expectations of 
the donors and poor clients 
within the existing hierarchical 
power relationships. 
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Source: Author- 2004 
 
Problems occurred at four levels. First, the MFI had to balance donors’ requirements 
and expectations with those of the poor. Donors became more focused on internal 
efficiency and tangible, reported results. As a result, the MFI must contend with 
pressures from donors to prove they are providing better services while using fewer 
resources to do so. Problems should therefore be seen in the light of existing unequal 
power relations between the two. Second, problems are expected between loan officers 
and management of the MFI as loan officers face powerful hierarchical accountability 
pressures and offset MFIs expectations against clients’, as if to imply they were simply 
‘caught in the middle’. At a third level, problems arise between loan officers and clients 
as peer pressure within groups does not induce good repayment, forcing accountable 
loan officers to use other informal means. Under these circumstances, tensions rise 
between loan officers and borrowers as loan officers begin to absorb tasks that, in the 
original model, groups themselves ought to do, especially loan accounting work and 
 
CLIENTS OF MFIs 
Tensions: Clients expect loan 
officers to be flexible (‘bend’ 
rules) and sympathetic to their 
personal circumstances with 
some ‘pastoral’ care. 
 
Meet institutional 
targets: loan repayments 
and disbursement, client 
load &formation of 
groups, and thereby 
account for group’s 
performance 
Tensions: Expected 
to balance the 
expectations of the 
MFI and those of 
the clients. 
Influence clients 
to meet the given 
tasks
Tensions as clients resist change and 
certain aspects of the group 
methodology, such as the use of mutual 
guarantee, resulting in weak group 
accountability and problematic 
relationships. 
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recoveries. The fourth level of problems occurred within the clients’ groups due to their 
inability to enforce the mutual guarantee. All this occurs amid increasing mistrust and 
secrecy regarding credit related matters. Such sensitivity could offend clients if loan 
officers for example followed them to their own homes, particularly in a Zambian 
context where microfinance is still in its infancy. The problem of ‘delinquency’ should 
therefore be understood from that perspective, coupled with loan officers’ position that: 
‘we are everything’ and have jobs to protect. 
 
‘Delinquency’ and Loan Officers’ Adaptation 
Loan officers did not necessarily follow the officially stated lending procedures. For 
instance, the Trust bank size was reduced to 15 from 20 plus, and the formal orientation 
period of 10 weeks was not strictly adhered to, and client’s businesses were not visited 
before disbursing loans. Officers also reprioritized their work to recover money in 
arrears and consequently sidelined other key roles such as marketing the product, 
facilitating the formation of groups (outreach), proper client orientation and timely loan 
disbursement  (frustrating ‘good’ clients). 
 Loan officers pointed to a lack of shared understanding of the ‘realities on the ground’ 
regarding poor clients. This created suspicion within management and reciprocal 
frustration on the part of loan officers who, on the one hand, were being asked to be 
assertive in collection, and on the other hand, trust bank members expected them to be 
patient and understanding. Enforcing loan repayment at ‘Wesu’ branch was 
problematic, because CETZAM did not have a clear mandate to prosecute defaulters. 
Johnson et al (2003) report similar difficulties in handling defaulters at one of the MFIs 
in Kenya, but the difference is that, in this case, CETZAM and not the defaulting client 
bore the costs. The original intention was that the borrower progressively takes over the 
lender’s responsibilities for monitoring group repayment behaviour, taking action, if 
necessary, to enforce repayment (Ito, 2003). These arrangements were supposed to free 
the loan officer for other constructive activities. However, loan officers devoted more 
time and effort to chasing up defaulters, and not initial loan disbursement or new group 
mobilisation, knowing that group enforcement of joint- liability was weak and 
ineffective.  
  
While CETZAM management claimed to be aware of such problems, they did not 
espouse clear strategies to solve it. As a result loan officers actively pursued defaulters 
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(a task meant for group leaders) instead of building networks that would enable mutual 
guarantees (Copestake, et al., 2001; Ito, 2003). Members typically valued harmony 
more than alternative social sanctions. This is in line with findings by Paxton (1996) in 
Burkina Faso, where borrower groups applied little ex post pressure for the same 
reasons (quoted in MKNelly and Kevane, 2003: 2027).  Loan officers, together with the 
branch manager at ‘Wesu’, considered they were under great pressure to retrieve the 
money borrowed and reduce the portfolio at risk. They therefore prioritised 
‘delinquency’ at the expense of other activities as institutional survival came first. 
Sharma and Zeller (1997) reported the same concerns by field workers in Bangladesh. 
Consequently, money issues dominated discussions in the daily morning meetings.  
One loan officer put it this way:  
Clients shun meetings because they don’t want you to talk about them. They tend to lose interest 
if all you talk about is money and defaulters. To them, it’s a sheer waste of time to sit in these 
meetings. But again if the default thing is still there, we will be forced to talk about it 
 
The outcome of such a pre-occupation with chasing up defaulters as seen at ‘Wesu’ 
branch (probably a reflection of the whole organisation) is twofold: The first is, the 
‘gasp for cash’ – a concern for immediate survival where defaulters are pursued by 
whatever it takes. The second is the ‘suffocation’ of growth. There was no new growth 
as loan officers did not facilitate the formation of new groups and thereby failed to 
advance the outreach frontiers. Loan officers complained that, ‘management did not 
take into account the fact that the ‘delinquency’ exercise was time consuming, stressful 
and frustrating’.  As we shall see below, however, the immediate survival strategy is 
problematic and potentially self-defeating. This is well illustrated by members from the 
solidarity group and trust bank (see box 2) 
 
Box 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I think that these loan officers have too many trust banks and solidarity groups that are not doing well 
and so they are spending their time debt collecting you see! So those of us doing well are suffering. 
We are neglected and concentration is on those in arrears and defaulting. For instance our loan officer 
is now just concentrating on groups that are giving him problems. He has just become a debt collector 
and sometimes he doesn’t even come to our meetings-just busy chasing those owing. Do we have to 
be pushing them? (Trust bank member-2). 
 
I have seen a problem with CETZAM-this is that, initially when we started learning about their 
methodology they would tell us, ha! that the time of waiting for the next loan would be short once the 
previous one is paid for. They told us two weeks. But look at them now! They take their time and 
keep on promising until may be a month goes- even f r those paying well. So where is the incentive 
in paying back on time? Now is this good? Admittedly, there are times when we clients cause these 
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The first client accused loan officers of concentrating on poor performing groups and 
neglecting the ‘good’ ones (i.e. management by exception), as their needs are not 
attended to in time. The second client claimed loan officers were delaying the 
disbursement of loans unnecessarily while both clients express feelings of frustration 
and disappointment with the resulting shift of emphasis. Musona (2004) found Zambian 
MFIs slow in loan processing and disbursement, which in turn increased client exit. 
Delays in loan disbursement here damaged the reputation of CETZAM (by word of 
mouth) and are harming both sustainability and growth. Consequently, outreach for the 
branch declined, but costs per member increased due to the resource intensive exercise 
of chasing up defaulters.  
 The survivalist approach taken had therefore displaced other key activities such as the 
selling of CETZAM’s products to potential borrowers and the formation of new groups. 
One loan officer (visibly annoyed) said: 
 As loan officers we have no time to sell CETZAM products, form new groups and give proper 
orientation. It seems marketing is secondary and collecting money for now is priority.  
Loan officers also revealed that, on average, each loan officer had only managed to 
form two new groups in that year. ‘There is just too much time spent chasing up 
defaulters’ they said, an exercise proving costly to the organisation, as well as 
immediately frustrating to loan officers.    
 
‘Delinquency’ Management Strategies 
Loan officers first threatened to use the group’s loan security fund (LSF) to clear 
arrears.  In several group meetings attended, loan officers used the LSF to force 
members into putting pressure on those defaulting and to create a sense of urgency in 
those who had finished paying and were not ready to forfeit their LSF. However, this 
practice of seizing clients’ LSF may have been effective in the short-term, but could 
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well undermine members’ long-term participation. Members whose repayment records 
were good did not appreciate losing the LSF and therefore leave. One client indeed 
said:  
‘Why is the branch talking so much about arrears when our LSF is used to offset loan amounts not 
paid by the group’?  
MKNelly and Kevane (2003) report similar negative sentiments among group clients in 
Burkina Faso, where the practice destabilized groups and consequently re-loans were 
delayed. Another strategy was to use external pressure- police officers- to get defaulters 
to pay or confiscate household items for sale to recover the money. While in 
Bangladesh (Grameen Bank, BRAC etc), field workers would not use police help to 
recover loans, but asked influential local people to exert pressure (Ahmad, 2002; Jain 
and Moore, 2003), at CETZAM  the loan officer did use the police instead: 
I have had two situations where I have used the police and in one case I had to take one person to 
the police and she was locked up and later paid something but relations were destroyed. I feel very 
bad about it. It’s just that my job demands that I bring back the money. It is not right because in 
most cases items grabbed may not necessarily have come from CETZAM’s loan (L/O 2). 
Such ‘harassment’ however, serves both an immediate purpose of trying to recover the 
money and the more important, broader purpose of signalling publicly that the 
consequences of becoming a defaulter can be made to be embarrassing, especially in a 
society where credit and debt are intensely private issues (Aryeetey, 1996 quoted in 
Bastelaer, 1999: 13; Christensen, 1993).  When asked why the police were being used, 
a visibly disturbed L/O said: 
If I don’t do this, what will the office think of me? They will not believe my story- at least if I tell 
them that the police went with me to clients’ businesses, they will then take me seriously and 
believe that I am working. Those people [at the office] don’t listen. And at times, clients have to 
see one of their friends dragged to the police for them to get serious with payments (L/O 4). 
From the loan officer’s perspective, this use of police met two purposes: authenticating 
their ‘audit’ reports to the manager, and shaming defaulters into paying. Presumably, 
such social shame creates difficulties for many, as defaulters become stigmatized, 
sending negative signals to non-members about CETZAM. Other studies have reported 
defaulters losing household items (see Ito, 2003; MKNelly and Kevane, 2003; Rahman, 
1999b). Clients revealed that this can be equally embarrassing, especially if it leads to 
domestic tensions and violence, weakening marriage ties. This was illustrated in a focus 
group discussion of five women and three men. 
s:\staff\dro - durham research online\fulltext\departments\business school\4288\journal article-acforum.doc 23
It’s important that women inform husbands because there are times when CETZAM grabs items 
from defaulters and so if [I] the husband has bought [my] TV, Fridge etc and discover that these 
have been taken for sale to recover money owed, my wife would be in big trouble [with a 
frowning face]. This creates a lot of tensions in homes (man client).  
Those who do it in secret usually get in trouble and some even get divorces (elderly woman client 
2).  
However, the CETZAM chief executive officer believed that seizing assets from clients 
and using the police did not fit with the social agenda and therefore did not openly 
support such action, but acknowledged it as a sensitive issue. 
 A third option was that of policing ‘time’ by paying frequent visits and ‘pouncing’ on 
defaulters at dawn and dusk. Loan officers appeared compliant, citing that they had jobs 
to protect.  Such visits at awkward hours were themselves shameful, visibly exposing 
defaulters to their community and also denied loan officers’ control of their ‘private’ 
time. Loan officers voiced concern over their personal safety in these ‘raids,’ that they 
felt very vulnerable to attacks by angry and violent clients. The gravity of the matter 
was shared by one of the senior managers at head office who cited an incident where a 
dog attacked a loan officer as he visited a defaulter’s home.  
In view of these strategies, CETZAM had increasing problems with stressful and 
frustrated loan officers. This was well captured by two loan officers in separate 
incidents, the first after a hectic day out together, claiming that:  
A loan officer you see is supposed to be on the side of management as well as on the side of 
clients. So you have no time for own personal things because of too much pressure, no time to 
relax and sometimes all you dream about is delinquency. I actually dread reporting for work, as I 
have to figure out what I will have to say to convince the manager.  
The second, through an email two months later, wrote:  
I have just had a lousy day at work, and thank God for your mail, it brought me back to the real 
world. My loan officer job is as usual, and we continue to write the daily reports-it is such hell! I 
think we just might end up resigning (communication received 26 February 2004). 
          These two quotations reveal signs of emotional stress and effort on the part of 
management to make loan officers explicitly justify what they have done, make their 
job more transparent, and thus controllable from above, in a manner of managerial 
surveillance (Hillhorst, 2003). A particular branch manager asserted that microfinance 
was a ‘sensitive business’ and ‘the moment loan officers are frustrated you have a 
problem’. Ahmad (2002) makes reference to similar signs of stress in Bangladesh with 
PROSHIKA, where a field worker reported having no leisure but a life made tense 
whenever he had to abuse his clients to recover money and thus save his job. This 
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heightens tensions between both loan officers and clients, and management and loan 
officers, and also exacerbates repayment problems as well as ‘suffocating’ new growth. 
 
It is clear that CETZAM cannot survive on the ‘core’ business of pursuing defaulters on 
the scale observed here where it also relied upon good client-loan officer relationships 
(Schreiner, 1999) and few defaults. Loan officers were acting more as debt collectors 
than enablers, and therefore experienced burnout and stress through increasing self-
sacrifice. This expectation may lead them to withdraw and, as one manager said, ‘When 
a loan officer resigns, it’s difficult to replace them’ because, according to Schreiner 
(1999), ‘they are not interchangeable parts’.  
In addition, the use of police, confiscation of assets and possible morning and evening 
‘raids’ were creating tensions between the task-oriented role and the ‘nurturing’ role 
that loan officers were expected to perform. For example, the MFI formally expected 
‘professionalism’ since they have to fulfil their organisation’s expectations, while 
clients on the other hand, expect to see more of the social skills of the loan officer- 
working ‘from the heart and not the mind’. Loan officers therefore engaged in what 
Hochschild (1983) calls ‘emotional labour’ to achieve the financial goals and were 
subject to ‘emotion management’ (Fineman, 2000; Taylor, 1998). This emotion 
management was demanding. For instance, loan officers acted as if they were interested 
in clients’ lives, their children, their personal problems such as sickness, family funerals 
etc. They ‘put on a sympathetic faces’ in matters that were otherwise purely financial. 
Clients on the other hand respond to loan officers who show that they care and feel for 
them. Anything else on the part of loan officers could reduce goodwill and make further 
client mobilisation difficult. In addition, when emotion management fails, it is possible 
that a trust bank will dissolve and loan repayment will fail. These performed emotions 
and tensions shape the course and outcomes of strategies used in recovering debt but 
are sometimes overlooked. Demanding as they might be, loan officers were quick to 
mention that such displays were rewarding to the extent that they produced increased 
loan repayment, (out of social rather than contractual obligation).  
 
CONCLUSION 
Although CETZAM is neither anywhere near the scale and size nor stage of 
development of the Bangladesh MFIs, it is nevertheless arguably increasingly 
representative of emerging MFIs –especially in Africa going through early 
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developmental problems. The case shows that, while the original Bangladesh model has 
been officially confirmed and/or academically studied and evaluated, albeit in strikingly 
economic terms, it is still possible to question the answers it would provide.  Moreover, 
Bangladesh is no longer at the same early founding stage as other frontier territory like 
Zambia, which has its own 'greenfield' issues to resolve while Bangladesh moves on.  
The successes claimed for the latter nevertheless constitute important hopes and values 
for founding and developing microfinance at these other frontiers which few wish to 
quell with accounts about failings and failures as well.  Emerging 'second 
generation' microfinance institutions may draw upon this other knowledge yet still 
encounter different problems in the field which they were not thereby led to expect or 
necessarily plan ahead for. To extend financial services to 100 million of the poor by 
the end of 2005 (Wydick, 2002),  MFIs need further insights into the ‘real’ world of a 
loan officer faced with divergent expectations and powerful hierarchical levels of 
accountability if they are to advance their lending work and meet the set targets. The 
case shows that outside Bangladesh, there is more to be learnt about how microfinance 
has been translated elsewhere, what loan officers do, and how they are managed. An 
additional insight is that clients and loan officers bring very different expectations to 
their encounters, which clearly impact upon whatever results.  
The findings also raise concerns over the nature of accountability that is becoming 
required of loan officers by management in the context of ‘overblown’ non-repayment 
of loans and the extent to which management can demand accountability without 
inhibiting loan officers’ work and microfinance development. This is not to obscure the 
need to solve ‘loan delinquency’ problems with all the resources at its disposal but it 
does call for more consistency with the hopes and values of microfinance proper. Any 
such solution ultimately needed to be better aligned to, and also drawn from, those 
hopes and values for it to remain ‘double tasked’, knowing that anything less risked 
converting its mission and organisation into something else.  
The case also provides evidence to support Schreiner’s (1999) view that microfinance 
depends on personal relationships and that loan officers play a key role in building and 
maintaining the social bonds which serve as a resource for both clients and loan 
officers. However, what seems prominent in this study is the difficulties loan officers 
have in pursuing defaulters and the means used. In such a crisis, loan officer’s success 
or failure may depend on how best the loan officer plays and manages emotions and 
relationships with clients. Consistent with Ahmad (2002) and Goetz (2001), the 
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findings of the study show that making the problems of late loan repayment more 
visibly public can be embarrassing or shameful for the client with lasting negative 
effects for the MFI. The findings also some support Gjerding’s (2002) view that, 
microcredit lending process is not straightforward as complicated social and cultural 
patterns of behaviour, strategies and power structures have a big say when it comes to 
discovering what the outcome of a specific micro credit programme will be. This case, 
albeit related to one specific case study, indicates that giving careful attention to loan 
officers –the implementers of lending policies and mobilizers of clients can enhance 
our understanding of microfinance development. While the level of development and 
rules of governance of the microfinance industry, interest rates, organisational costs and 
lending policies are all important contributors to institution’s performance, the success 
or failure of microfinance depends largely on loan officers. If loan officers fail, 
microfinance (especially group based) fails with them.  
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